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Georgian Dream’s election victory puts the country at a
crossroads between Russia and the West.
by Blog Admin
This month’s parliamentary elections in Georgia resulted in defeat for President Mikheil
Saakashvili’s party, and a clear majority of seats for Bidzina Ivanishvili’s ‘Georgian Dream’
coalition. Hrant Kostanyan assesses the impact of Georgian Dream’s victory, arguing that the
country will likely pursue a more balanced foreign policy, maintaining its course of integration
with the EU and NATO, but also seeking to improve relations with Russia. However, this foreign
policy vision will have to face a tough reality test.
Georgian Dream and Reality: a new post-election era?
The victory of  the coalit ion dubbed Georgian Dream (GD) in parliamentary elections on October 1st
represents the f irst ever transf er of  power through the ballot box in Georgian history. With 84 seats out of
150, the GD has the majority it needs to f orm a government, leading to another f irst in Georgian polit ics:
cohabitation – with the president and the prime minister coming f rom opposing parties. This ends nearly a
decade of  total polit ical rule by President Saakashvili, but what does it mean f or Georgia’s domestic and
f oreign policy?
Saakashvili’s mixed legacy
The Rose Revolution of  2004 did not wholly live up to the promise of  its name. Under Saakashvili there
were drastic improvements in public services, bureaucracy, inf rastructure and a crackdown on petty
corruption and organised crime. The economy grew, but the benef its were not f elt by all: unemployment
f igures stand at around 35 per cent and poverty levels at 25 per cent. Democracy itself  was under attack,
with the government overpowering the legislature and judiciary and limiting media f reedom. The recent video
tapes of  prison inmates being tortured have exposed the ugly side of  Saakashvili’s established system.
President Saakashvili ran an election campaign that should have assured victory f or his United National
Movement (UNM), using every administrative, judicial, police and media resource possible, including
tampering with the electoral rules and redrawing constituency boundaries. His main contender, Ivanishvili
was portrayed as a Russian agent sent to derail Georgia f rom its route of  Euro-Atlantic integration. Yet,
despite these violations, the majority of  Georgians voted f or change.
Domestic challenges ahead
Ivanishvili now takes of f ice as prime minister, amid prof ound challenges and domestic constraints. His GD
coalit ion will not have the complete power that Saakashvili used to enjoy. For the coming year at least the
coalit ion will have to work with President Saakashvili, who still holds strong executive powers that are
supposed to be transf erred to the prime minister, but only af ter presidential elections in October 2013.
Ivanishvili’s init ial ‘solution’ to power-sharing was to call f or the president’s resignation on October 2nd .
But Ivanishvili has since announced that the president’s resignation is not “a polit ical demand or ult imatum”
and is shying away f rom creating the image of  a power-hungry leader like the president. The GD has also
stated that although its members were treated unf airly in the run-up to the elections, a witch-hunt like the
one of  2003-2004 will not be repeated.
Ivanishvili is not only constrained by
Mikhe il Saakashvil i  (Cre d it: Euro p e an Pe o p le ’s Party / CC BY-SA 3.0)
Ivanishvili is not only constrained by
existing presidential powers, but also by
his own six-party coalit ion, which includes
a diverse array of  western-minded liberals
and xenophobic nationalists whose
unif ying f orce has been the desire to
remove Saakashvili and his UNM f rom
power. Against this backdrop, Ivanishvili is
expected to tackle serious domestic
issues and create a f airer social system.
The current employment regime exploits
its workers. Agriculture was one of  the
main victims of  the last decade’s policies
and now requires aid and the stimulation
of  local production. A number of
commodity cartels need breaking up and
f airer conditions f or business should be
established. The law enf orcement system, the judiciary and media are all crying out f or liberalisation and
ref orm.
A new foreign policy vision
Over the last decade, Saakashvili hailed membership of  NATO and the European Union as top f oreign
policy priorit ies f or Georgia. By contrast, relations with Russia were at their lowest ebb, especially f ollowing
the 2008 war, af ter which Russia recognised the independence of  Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the f irst
post-election meeting between Saakashvili and Ivanishvili on  October 9th 2012, the latter stated that their
f oreign policy goals were similar. Saakashvili, however, spoke of  “f undamental dif f erences.” The truth lies
somewhere in between.
Conceptually, Ivanishvili aims to make the shif t f rom playing ‘geopolit ical games’ to engaging in regionalism.
In real terms, while staying on the path of  EU and NATO integration, Ivanishvili intends to improve relations
with Russia. This poses a number of  problems. On the one hand, some parties in his coalit ion openly
oppose Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. On the other hand, although Moscow welcomed the election
results in Georgia, the normalisation of  relations with Russia in parallel with moves to deepen Western
integration will be a tough balancing act to pull of f , as will convincing Russia to reopen its market to
Georgian goods such as wine, f ruit and mineral water. As a starter in the process of  the normalisation of
relations and opening its market, Russia might ask f or a sof tening of  the current rhetoric used by Georgia
in describing Russia on the international scene. This would be a dif f icult concession f or Ivanishvili to make
at the moment.
Ivanishvili’s victory is also unlikely to change the posit ions of  the Moscow-backed de f acto authorit ies of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia towards Tbilisi in the f oreseeable f uture. The operationalisation of
Ivanishvili’s balanced f oreign policy vision will thus have to f ace a tough reality test. For now, the
international community may expect more stable leadership in Tbilisi. Ivanishvili ran an impressive election
campaign. Running the country will prove more of  a challenge.
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